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The purpose of this paper is to reveal which kinds of public invest-
ment cause municipal mergers to create a scal common pool problem
in Japan. In particular, we focus on whether municipal mergers in-
crease road and public park construction just before the mergers or
not because previous papers reveal only that municipal mergers in-
crease local bonds. The empirical results reveal that the subordinate
merger partners rapidly increase their road and public park expenses
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering study of Hinnerich (2009) was published, which reveals
a scal common pool problem through municipal mergers in the literature
on the law of 1/n, some papers have attempted to estimate the relationship
between local bonds or accumulated debts and municipal mergers1. In the
literature, the size of the scal common pool increases in municipal mergers,
which explains why some partners of merged municipalities, which increase
public projects, are able to receive benets from their projects even though
the costs are shared among their merger partners. Several papers revealed
that municipalities increase their local bonds through municipal mergers,
which creates the scal common pool problem (Hinnerich (2009), Jordahl
and Liang (2010), Hansen (2014), Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015), Hirota
and Yunoue (2017))2 According to Hirota and Yunoue (2017), subordinate
merger partners in Japan, which suer from adverse scal conditions and
depopulation, create the scal common pool problem just before mergers.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal which kinds of public investments
municipal mergers engage in to create a scal common pool problem in
Japan. In particular, we focus on public investment expenses for both road
and public park construction just before the mergers. To our knowledge,
no empirical study has yet revealed which public investments are increased
through the scal common pool problem created by municipal mergers. Pre-
vious papers revealed only whether the merged municipalities increased their
total expenditures, total investment expenses or local bonds just before the
mergers. Consequently, in this paper, we identify the causal eects of the
municipal mergers and their road and public park construction just before
the mergers.
2 Empirical framework
In this study, we reveal which kinds of public investments municipal mergers
use to create a scal common pool problem in Japan. In particular, we focus
on the expenditures for both road and public park construction for both the
merged and nonmerged municipalities by using Japan's municipal data just
before the mergers. Previous studies did not study which public investments
increased through the scal common pool problem for municipal mergers,
which explains why they reveal only whether the merged municipalities in-
1The literature on "the law of 1/n" was formalized by Weingast et al. (1981)
2Bless and Baskaran (2016) did not observe any scal common pool problem for vol-
untary municipal mergers in Germany. Nakazawa (2016) show that merged municipali-
ties have fewer incentives to engage in free-riding. However, Hirota and Yunoue (2017)
revealed that the subordinate merger partners positively increase the local bonds just be-
fore mergers, addressing sample selection bias by using propensity score matching with
the dierence in dierences method.
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crease their total expenditures and local bonds just before the municipal
mergers or not.
We use the empirical framework established by Hirota and Yunoue (2017),
who applied propensity score matching with the dierence in dierences
method (PSM-DID) to address sample selection bias and time-consistent
unobserved eects. Because Japan's central government encouraged munic-
ipalities to merge through the Special Municipal Mergers Law (called the
carrot and stick policy), between FY2004 and FY2005, municipal mergers
in Japan were not random and voluntary. The special law was enforced
from FY1999 to FY2005. As a result, the number of municipalities rapidly
decreased from 3232 to 1820 during the period, especially in FY2004 and
FY2005. For example, the central government, through the special law,
stated that the unspecied grants received by municipalities would decrease,
if the municipalities did not choose to merge during the enforcement period
of the special law. On the other hand, the municipalities would be allowed
to receive the same amount in unspecic grants for 10 years as well as before
mergers if they chose to merge. Almost all the municipalities that chose to
merge were dependent on unspecic grants and faced adverse scal condi-
tions. In particular, the central government required the municipalities to
identify their potential merger partners at least one or two years ahead if
the municipalities wanted to receive special support such as special grants
under the special law. Therefore, we focus on the municipalities that merg-
erd in FY2004 and their behavior in FY2002 and FY2003 as a treatment
period. In other words, we consider the period from FY1998 to FY2001
as the pretreatment period and the period from FY2002 to FY2003 as the
treatment period. Thus, to address the sample selection problem, we use
data from the same periods and use the same propensity scores calculated
by Hirota and Yunoue (2017).
In addition, to identify the scal common pool problem for municipal
mergers, we use the population as a treatment group, which lead to the
decision to be subordinate merger partners. We conrm that the subordinate
merger partners remarkably increase their local bonds just before mergers.
Therefore, we use the treatment group and consider two patterns exhibited
by the subordinate merger partners, which are the same as the previous
study. The basic model determines whether the population size of the merger
partner is smaller than half of the population size of the new municipality;
in this case, the treatment group equals 1 and zero otherwise3. Moreover, we
use the subordinate merger partner model because the basic model includes
some bias involving the dominant merger partners. The dominant merger
partners do not like to issue additional bonds before mergers because they
3This model is very similar to Hinnerich's (2009) free-rider model. According to Hin-
nerich (2009), merger partners have an incentive to be a free rider depending on their
population size divided by that of the new municipality.
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must repay such bonds by themselves after the mergers. Therefore, we use
the following subordinate merger partner model if the population size of the
subordinate merger partner is smaller than half of the population size of the
dominant merger partner; in this case, the treatment group equals 1 and
zero otherwise.
To identify which kinds of public investment the merged municipalities
increase just before the mergers, we use the same data and empirical frame-
work as the previous study, except for the data on road and public park
expenses. Consequently, we estimate a consistent estimator of the average
treatment eect on the treated (ATT) of the PSM-DID method4. The fol-
lowing equation describes the ATT, which can eliminate sample selection
bias by matching the merged municipalities with very similar nonmerged
municipalities, which have almost the same propensity score.
^ATT =
1
N1t
N1tX
i=1
[Y1ti  
N0tX
j=1
W (i; j)Y0tj ]
  1
N1s
N1sX
i=1
[Y1si  
N0sX
j=1
W (i; j)Y0sj ]
Yi is per capita road expenses, and per capita public park construction ex-
penses5 Y1 denotes the merged municipality, and Y0 denotes the nonmerged
municipality. N1 indicates the size of the merged municipalities sample, and
N0 indicates the size of the nonmerged municipalities sample. W (i; j) is a
weight assigned to a nonmerged municipality based on the propensity score,
and
P
j W (i; j) = 1. In addition, t and s index the pretreatment period
and the end of the treatment period. N1t and N1s indicate the number of
municipalities at each point in time.
4We actually succeed in estimating the probit model for calculating as the same propen-
sity scores that are used in the previous study. To estimate the propensity score using
the probit model, we use the following covariates: population, area, share of population
over 65, share of population under 15, share of industry, share of grants, and share of debt
stock. In addition, we completely satisfy the balancing property of the covariates between
the treatment and control groups after propensity score matching. We apply three dier-
ent matching methods; nearest neighbor, radius, and kernel matching under the common
support assumption. The detailed results for the matching methods are available upon
request. In addition, see Hirota and Yunoue (2017).
5The amount of the road and public park expenses are given in units of one thousand
Japanese yen. One thousand Japanese yen is approximately 10 dollars at an exchange rate
of 100 Japanese yen to one U.S. dollar. The amount of the public investment expenses for
both road and public park construction are items of Tandoku Jigyo Hi - Doboku Hi from
Chihou Zaisei Jyokyo Chosa Hyo (in Japanese).
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3 Empirical results
Figure 1 indicates that there is a substantial dierence between the treat-
ment and control group. In the basic model, on average, the per capita
road expenses of the treatment group are between 35 and 40, while those of
the control group are between 20 and 30. In addition, the per capita road
expenses of the treatment group start increasing in FY2000. Nevertheless,
the per capita road expenses of the control group exhibit a decreasing trend.
The per capita public park expenses of the treatment group repeatedly move
up and down during the period, while those of the control group exhibit a
decreasing trend. In particular, the per capita public park expenses of the
treatment group remarkably increase from FY2002 to FY2003. Likewise, in
the subordinate merger partner model, we can conrm a similar movement
of public investment with the basic model. We are able to observe a clearly
dierent trend between both groups in the pretreatment period. Therefore,
we should suspect that the parallel trend assumption of the DID estimation
breaks down due to the special law, which explicitly targets certain types of
municipalities such as those suering from adverse scal conditions. That is,
we are concerned that the municipal mergers in Japan were not random and
voluntary. Thus, we attempt to estimate the PSM-DID method to address
sample selection bias.
Table 1 reports the results of the PSM-DID method6. In the basic model,
per capita road expenses increase between 6.5 and 8.3 in FY2003, which are
between approximately 16% and 20% of the average level of the per capita
road expenses in FY1998. The gures for FY2002 slightly increase to be-
tween approximately 3.2 and 3.7. These results are positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% or 5% level, except for the result of the most closely
matched neighbor in FY2002. However, we cannot observe that the ATTs of
the per capita public park expenses are not statistically signicant, except
for the result of kernel matching for FY2003.
In the subordinate merger partner model, we are able to reveal the pos-
itive and statistically signicant results for both road and public park ex-
penses in FY2003. Per capita road expenses increase between 4.8 and 6 in
FY2003, which is between approximately 10.9% and 13.3% of the average
level of the per capita road expenses in FY1998. In addition, per capita
public park expenses increase between 1.08 and 1.5 in FY2003, which is be-
tween approximately 76% and 107% of the average level of the per capita
public park expenses in FY1998.
6We estimate many public investment expenses as outcome variables; river develop-
ment, harbor improvement, sewage facilities, residential construction, airport construc-
tion, etc. However, we cannot conrm the statistical dierences between the treatment
and control groups. In addition, Table A.1 reports the results of the placebo treatment
periods. There are no statistically dierences in the averages of the treatment and control
groups in the pretreatment period.
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Notably, relatively small merged municipalities create the scal common
pool problem by increasing both road and public park construction just be-
fore the mergers. These results are obviously consistent with the results
of previous papers because they revealed that subordinate merger partners
rapidly increase their local bonds just before the mergers. In addition, al-
though most municipalities have engaged in little public park construction
before enforcing the special law, they clearly increase their construction just
before the mergers and rely on the dominant merger partner. For example,
we conrm that the per capita public park expenses of some subordinate
merger partners are almost zero in FY1998. The special law is very helpful
for the subordinate merger partners. In addition, we believe that construct-
ing new public parks is relatively easier than constructing new roads for the
subordinate merger partners.
4 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper is to reveal which kinds of public investments
cause municipal mergers to create a scal common pool problem in Japan.
We focus on public investment expenses for both road and public park con-
struction incurred just before mergers by both the treatment and control
groups.
The results indicate that relatively small merged municipalities create
the scal common pool problem by increasing both road and public park
construction just before the mergers. These results are obviously consistent
with the results of previous papers. The subordinate merger partners clearly
increase their construction just before the mergers and rely on the dominant
merger partner. The special law is very helpful for the subordinate merger
partners. In addition, we consider that constructing new public parks is
relatively easier than constructing new roads for the subordinate merger
partners because they hope to succeed in merging by the specic deadline
of the special law to receive special support from the central government.
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Figure 1: Mean public investment expense between FY1998 and FY2003
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